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THE PRO-LIFE SPRING AND THE FUTURE OF ROE V. WADE
LYNN D. WARDLE

ABSTRACT
After decades of repression of pro-life legal activity, there was an
extraordinary harvest of pro-life legislation enacted in the United States in
2011-2013. It was followed, as the night follows the day, by an eruption of
judicial rulings invalidating many of the new pro-life laws. This article
reviews each of the abortion decisions comprising the abortion
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States (dozens of
decisions spread over four decades). It traces the major themes in and
theories that underlie the abortion jurisprudence. It notes the checkered
free-speech jurisprudence of the Court regarding expressions by pro-life
critics, protesters and demonstrators. It reviews the pro-life legislation
passed in the pro-life Spring of 2011-13, and considers reasons for the
flourishing of legislative efforts to protect pre-natal human life. The
scandal of convicted Dr. Kermit Gosnell and “house of horrors” abortion
clinic in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the controversy of abortion
coverage in Obamacare have called attention to the filthy practice of
abortion and generated responsive pro-life legislation. But judicial
protection of abortion-on-demand will continue, as must pro-life efforts to
stop the carnage.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Spring is the season in which the cold, lifeless dreariness of winter
gives way to sunshine, warmth, extending daylight, rebirth of nature, and
new growth. Shakespeare poetically described spring as:
When daisies pied and violets blue
And lady-smocks all silver-white
And cuckoo-buds of yellow hue
Do paint the meadows with delight,
The cuckoo then, on every tree,
Mocks married men; for thus sings he,
Cuckoo;
Cuckoo, cuckoo: Oh word of fear,
Unpleasing to a married ear!1
So the term “spring” has long symbolized rebirth, renewal, and
revitalization, and is symbolically used that way in many disparate contexts.
For example, the term “Prague Spring” is a well-known reference to a brief
period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia in 1968, during which
rigid Communist regulations were relaxed or withdrawn for several months,
until Russian military forces re-invaded the country and reestablished the
old Communist rule and rules.2 Similarly, the term “Arab Spring” refers to
1. William
Shakespeare,
Spring,
POETRY
FOUNDATION,
available
at
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/182368. A major implication of Shakespeare’s poem is
that Spring is torment for married men because it is the season of flirting and wooing and courting
from which married men are excluded by their marital commitments. Another implication of
Shakespeare’s description of the lament and sadness that Spring causes married men is that
married women do not lament; that marriage is joy to women, as it is bondage and sorrow for men
(at least in Springtime). That gender disparity and the reasons for it, and whether it still exists
today might be well worth examining, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
2. Prague
Spring,
BRITANNICA
ACADEMIC
EDITION,
available
at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473793/Prague-Spring.
Soon after he became first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on Jan. 5,
1968, [Alexander] Dubček granted the press greater freedom of expression; he also
rehabilitated victims of political purges during the Joseph Stalin era. In April he
promulgated a sweeping reform program that included autonomy for Slovakia, a
revised constitution to guarantee civil rights and liberties, and plans for the
democratization of the government. Dubček claimed that he was offering “socialism
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a short period “of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in
the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging
some of the region’s entrenched authoritarian regimes,” but these protests
proved as transitory as the season.3
Three characteristics of spring make it an apt metaphor for the
surprising flowering of pro-life legislation in the United States in 2011
through 2013, and particularly for the pro-life laws enacted in the state of
North Dakota in 2013. First, spring follows a season of dark, cold,
apparently lifelessness (dormant if not dead) winter. Second, spring is
filled with promise, potential, hope, and positive expectations; it is a time of
sprouting, budding, and new growth. Finally, spring ends; it is only a short,
cyclical season that passes into summer, then on towards another autumn,
and then onward to another winter. Spring is a reminder that winter will
come again. But the memory of spring can sustain us in the coldest winters;
we can enjoy roses in the winter as we remember that last spring and look
forward to the next season of springtime.
We have experienced a “springtime” of pro-life legislative activity for
several years. There has been an eruption of legislation regulating and
restricting abortion in the past two years. That explosion of anti-abortion
legislation may be related to several significant and stunning scandals that
were widely noticed by pro-life observers (albeit largely neglected by the
media).
There also has been an eruption of courts invalidating abortion
restrictions in 2013, which may also directly relate to the explosion of
publicity about abortion abuses in recent years. When people read or hear
about unsafe, deadly, or abusive practices, they tend to react, and legislators
tend to react by passing laws to deter or eliminate the safety hazards and
abuses. This was especially apparent during the Dr. Kermit Gosnell trial.4
The eruption of courts invalidating abortion restrictions in 2013 may
also directly relate to the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decisions in

with a human face.” By June many Czechs were calling for more rapid progress
toward real democracy. Although Dubček insisted that he could control the country’s
transformation, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries viewed the
developments as tantamount to counterrevolution. On the evening of Aug. 20, Soviet
armed forces invaded the country and quickly occupied it. As hard-line communists
retook positions of power, the reforms were curtailed, and Dubček was deposed the
following April. Id.
3. Arab
Spring,
BRITANNICA
ACADEMIC
EDITION,
available
at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1784922/Arab-Spring (“Demonstrators expressing
political and economic grievances faced violent crackdowns by their countries’ security forces.”).
4. Steven Ertelt, Kermit Gosnell Receives Third Consecutive Life Term for Killing Baby,
LIFENEWS.COM, May 15, 2013, http://www.lifenews.com/2013/05/15/kermit-gosnell-receivesthird-consecutive-life-term-for-killing-baby/.
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United States v. Windsor5 and Hollingsworth v. Perry.6 The ethic
underlying both the aggressive judicial invalidation of laws restricting and
regulating abortion and the aggressive judicial invalidation of laws denying
legal recognition to same-sex marriage is the same: it is the ethic of
unrestrained “judicial activism.” “Judicial activism” refers to policymaking by judicial decision; it is legislation by judicial decree. When
judges undertake to establish their preferred public policies (the policies
they would enact if they were legislators or executive order authors) they
engage in judicial activism. When the Supreme Court engages in judicial
activism (as it did in Windsor and Perry) and when there are other notable
incidents or significant incidence of lower courts engaging in judicial
activism, it is contagious. Other courts feel liberated to engage in judicial
activism themselves. So the same-sex marriage decisions of the Supreme
Court raised the flag of judicial activism, and served as a rallying cry for
lower courts to do the same. Thus, it should come as no surprise that lower
courts have invalidated the North Dakota abortion restrictions (which are at
least unpopular with, if not offensive to, the policy values of the intellectual
and liberal elite).
This article begins in Part II with a review of the decades long
repression of pro-life restrictions of abortion-on-demand. This examination
begins on January 22, 1973 — the date Roe v. Wade,7 and Doe v. Bolton8
were decided — and extends through the abortion regulations enacted in
2012 and 2013 by the North Dakota Legislature. North Dakota has
arguably been the leading state to push the envelope in enacting laws
designed to prevent irresponsible and dangerous abortion practices. Part III
reviews the “Pro-Life Spring of 2011-2013” by summarizing legislation
nationally and North Dakota’s remarkable legislative production. Part IV
looks ahead to “The Coming of Another Winter of Repression of Pro-Life
Public Legislation and Activity.” This section is a reminder that political
seasons, like climatic seasons, change and that it is wise to plan for such
changes when seeking to enact pro-life laws. Part V contains the
conclusion, which reminds us that we may have roses in winter by planning
ahead.

5.
6.
7.
8.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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II. THE WINTER OF ROE V. WADE AND DECADES OF
REPRESSION OF EFFORTS TO PROTECT PRE-NATAL HUMAN
LIFE
Between 1973 and 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States
rendered decisions in at least thirty-six major abortion cases, (cases dealing
with abortion restrictions and regulations)9 and at least ten other secondary
or collateral abortion cases that effectively invalidated all significant
restrictions upon or regulations of elective abortion on demand.10 The
Court struck down prohibitions of abortion, restrictions of abortion, and
regulations of abortion dealing with adult women, married women, single
women, husbands and fathers, daughters and parents, informed consent,
parental and spousal consent, parental and spousal notification, disposal of
fetal remains, public funding of abortion, pro-life protests against abortion,
pro-life speech, and every over conceivable type of abortion regulation.
The history of Supreme Court abortion litigation dates from 1971. In
United States v. Vuitch,11 the Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia
abortion law that prohibited all abortions “except those necessary for the
preservation of the mother’s life.”12 A lower federal court had dismissed
the prosecution of a doctor accused of performing illegal abortions on the
9. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); * Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women,
Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Schenck v. ProChoice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997); * Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753 (1994); * Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994): * Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); * Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); *
Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988);
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned
Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo..v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981);
Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird
(II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519
(1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird
(I), 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (* indicates pro-life free speech
or expression case).
10. See, e.g., * Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S.Ct. 9 (2012) (per curiam); * FEC v. Wisc. Right
to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); * Lawson v. Murray, 525 U.S. 955 (1998); Janklow v. Planned
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); * Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110
(1995); Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S.
1013 (1993); Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987); * Guste v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977);
Arnold v. Sendak, 429 U.S. 968 (1976); (* pro-life free speech or expression case).
11. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
12. Id. at 68-71.
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ground that the phrase “necessary” was unconstitutionally vague.13 The
Supreme Court reversed, noting that general usage and modern
understanding of the term within the medical profession rendered the statute
Thus, in its first case involving the
adequately discernable.14
constitutionality of abortion laws, the Court upheld a traditional categorical
proscription of abortion.
Two years later, however, in 1973, the United States Supreme Court
did an abrupt about-face when it announced its landmark decision in Roe v.
Wade,15 which established a woman’s right to obtain an abortion as part of
a constitutional right of privacy. The case involved a challenge, brought by
an indigent, pregnant single woman, to the Texas abortion laws that
prohibited abortions except when necessary to save the life of the mother. 16
A federal district court concluded that the Texas law was unconstitutional,
and the Supreme Court affirmed.17
Justice Blackmun began his opinion for the Court with the declaration
that: “[i]t perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal
abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent
vintage.”18 To support this introduction, Justice Blackmun expounded for
approximately twenty pages his perception of the world history of abortion
laws. The Court then analyzed three reasons proponents of the restrictive
abortion laws gave in support of these laws. The first was to discourage
extramarital sex, and neither the State of Texas nor the Court took this
argument seriously.19 The second state interest — maternal health —
received much more serious attention by the Court because it was argued
that abortion was a risky medical procedure.20 The Court reasoned that the
major motivation behind the restrictive laws was to protect a pregnant
woman from “a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy.”21 The
Court, however, concluded that this interest was not compelling because it
found that mortality rates appeared to be lower for women undergoing
early, legal abortions than for childbirth.22 The third reason advanced for
laws prohibiting abortion was the protection of prenatal life.23 The Court
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 71-72.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 149.at 149.
Id. at 149-150, 163.
Id. at 150.
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suggested, however, that the major purpose of abortion laws was merely to
protect the pregnant woman, not the fetus.24 The Court further opined that,
because philosophers and theologians were still debating about when life
begins, the interest in protecting prenatal life did not justify laws
prohibiting abortion.25 Consequently, the Court held:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.26
The Court did not hold that the woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy was absolute. Instead, the Court said that the state has a valid
interest in regulating medical procedures in order to safeguard the pregnant
woman’s health.27 Another significant qualification on the woman’s
privacy right is the state’s interest in protecting potential life: “[a]t some
point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion
decision.”28 The Court concluded that the point at which the State’s
important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother became
sufficiently compelling was the end of the first trimester because, until then,
mortality rates for abortion may be lower than for childbirth. After the first
trimester, the abortion procedure may by reasonably regulated for the
purpose of protecting the woman’s health.29 “With respect to the State’s
important and legitimate interest in potential life,” the Court held that the
“compelling point is at viability.”30 The Court ruled that the State may
prohibit abortions that are not necessary to save the mother’s life “or
health” after the fetus has become viable or, in other words, biologically
developed to the point that it is capable of sustaining meaningful life
outside the mother’s uterus.31
Thus, the Court divided pregnancy into three periods (the famous – or
infamous – “trimester” scheme). Under the trimester scheme, states are
only able to prohibit abortions during the last trimester (after viability) of a
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 151.
Id. at 133 n.22.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 163-65.
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woman’s pregnancy. Each state, however, must permit any abortions that
are recommended by a doctor to preserve a woman’s life or health. Before
viability, the states may not prohibit abortion. But, after the first trimester,
states may regulate the medical aspects of how abortions are performed to
the extent that such regulations are necessary to protect the health of women
seeking abortions. And, during the first trimester, no regulation of
abortions performed by doctors are permitted whatsoever.
Justice Rehnquist dissented by arguing that nothing in the language or
history of the Constitution supported the creation of a sweeping
constitutional right to abortion, and that the legality of abortion is more
appropriately left to legislative rather than judicial judgment.32 Justice
Rehnquist feared that confusion would result from the Court’s utilization of
a compelling state interest test because “the asserted right to an abortion is
not ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.’”33 He characterized the majority decision as “judicial
legislation.”34 Justice White, in a separate dissent also joined by Justice
Rehnquist, saw the decision as “an exercise of raw judicial power.”35 He
characterized the issue as whether there is a right to an abortion for
“pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or health of the
mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of a variety of
reasons—convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the
embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc.”36 In his view, it did not violate the
Constitution for states to prohibit abortions that were sought for reasons of
convenience rather than to protect maternal life or health.37
In the companion case, Doe v. Bolton,38 which was decided the same
day as Roe, the United States Supreme Court struck down Georgia’s
attempt to impose several procedural impediments to obtaining an
abortion.39 The Georgia statute at issue contained three key procedural
prerequisites to obtaining an abortion: hospital setting, hospital committee
approval, and two doctor concurrence.40 The first requirement was that the
abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals, which was a private organization.41 These
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 174 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 101 (1934)).
Id.
Id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting with Rehnquist, J., joining).
Id.
Id. at 222.
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Id. at 193.
Id. at 184.
Id.

2013]

PRO-LIFE SPRING

423

hospitals, however, were only available in fifty-four of Georgia’s one
hundred and fifty-nine counties.42 The Court reasoned that there was no
restriction on the performance of non-abortion surgery in unaccredited
hospitals, which indicated that the requirement was not reasonably related
to the purpose of the accreditation act because the act did not address
medical problems peculiar to abortion.43 Similarly, the Court invalidated
the procedural requirement that a hospital committee approve each abortion
because it lacked a constitutionally justifiable purpose.44 The Court
predicated this decision upon its belief that the requirement interfered with
the woman’s right to receive the medical care that was in her physician’s
best medical judgment and that such a requirement was redundant with
regard to the protection of potential life, since the woman’s physician
already made the relevant diagnosis.45 A third procedural impediment in
the Georgia statute required the concurrence of two doctors besides the
woman’s own physician.46 The Court rejected this requirement, reasoning
that approval by two other physicians had no rational connection to the
patient’s needs, unduly infringed on the doctor’s right to practice, and was
unprecedented because no other medical procedure required a similar
consultation.47 Thus, the Court struck down the Georgia statute.48
As a result of the sweeping decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Roe and Doe, all existing abortion laws in all states were
effectively invalidated, at least in part. Faced with the need to revise their
abortion laws, some states nevertheless retained their original abortion
statutes. Other states amended their laws to conform to Roe, but expressed
hostility to Roe and Doe either by an explicit statement or by including
provisions that would automatically reenact a statute of the type invalidated
in Roe if the United States Supreme Court opinion in Roe was reversed or
overruled by a constitutional amendment. Most states simply attempted to
conform their statutes to the standards set out in Roe, sometimes providing
a graduated scale of regulation for the second and third trimesters.
Three years after Roe was decided, the Supreme Court addressed, inter
alia, the issues of spousal and parental consent to abortion. In Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,49 Missouri’s comprehensive

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 192 n.11.
Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 198-200.
Id. at 193.
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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abortion regulation act was declared to be unconstitutional — for the most
part.50 Again, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court and stated
that a spousal consent requirement for married women violated a woman’s
right to privacy inasmuch as it gave their spouses a state-conferred “veto”
power over their private decisions to have abortion.51 Likewise, a
requirement of parental consent before an abortion could be performed
upon an unmarried minor was declared unconstitutional as inconsistent with
the privacy right of minor women.52 A prohibition of amniocentesis
abortions was also invalidated.53 The Court, however, upheld a simple
informed consent requirement and simple medical record keeping and
reporting requirements.54 Four dissenting justices55 and two concurring
justices,56 however, separately wrote to emphasize that the parental and
spousal interests were more substantial than the majority opinion seemed to
suggest.
The following year, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
state and federal laws restricting the public funding of abortions. In Maher
v. Roe,57 the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut regulation limiting public
assistance for abortions — but not childbirth — to those situations certified
to be medically or psychiatrically necessary.58 The Court rejected the
argument that the restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the right of privacy of indigent women. 59 In this
regard, the Court distinguished the use of state funds to encourage an
alternative (i.e., childbirth) from the use of criminal sanctions to prohibit
abortion.60 The Court opined that:
The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative
[than abortion], thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it
has imposed no restriction on access to abortion that was not
already there. The indigency that may make it difficult and in
some cases, perhaps, impossible, for some women to have

50. Id. at 83-84.
51. Id. at 74.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 75-79.
54. Id. at 80-81.
55. Id. at 94-95 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 102 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring).
57. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
58. Id. at 479-80.
59. Id. at 470-471.
60. Id. at 471-75.
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abortions is neither created not in any way affected by the
Connecticut regulation.61
The Court held that funding restrictions do not violate the right of privacy
and that they are rationally related to legitimate state interests in preserving
prenatal life.62
In a companion case, Beal v. Doe,63 the Court upheld a Pennsylvania
regulation providing state funds only for therapeutic abortions.64 The Court
rejected the argument that the state law was inconsistent with Title XIX of
the Social Security Act (“Medicaid”), interpreting Title XIX as neither
requiring nor forbidding participating states to subsidize elective
abortions.65 In the third abortion-funding case decided that day, Poelker v.
Doe,66 the Court upheld the policy of a city-funded hospital restricting the
performance of elective abortions.67 It affirmed the restrictive policy on the
grounds that the public entity could opt to use its scarce resources to
encourage childbirth rather than perform abortions.68
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Colautti v. Franklin,69 which held
that a Pennsylvania standard-of-care requirement designed to ensure
adequate medical attention for babies whose mothers had undergone
abortion after the point of fetal viability was unconstitutional as
interpreted.70 An extremely exacting standard of thoroughness and
precision in statutory drafting was emphasized, and the Court refused to
give any benefit to the states’ interpretation of the meaning and purpose of
the statute.71 The Court concluded that the relevant statute had an
impermissible purpose of discouraging abortion.72
That same year in Bellotti v. Baird (II),73 the Supreme Court
invalidated a Massachusetts statute that provided that a minor seeking an
abortion had to obtain parental consent before receiving an abortion; if the
minor was unable to obtain parental consent, she could get an abortion by
obtaining approval of a state court judge upon showing that the abortion

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 474.
Id. at 478.
432 U.S. 438 (1977).
Id. at 447.
Id.
432 U.S. 519 (1977).
Id. at 521.
Id.
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 392-94.
Id. at 401.
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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would be in her best interests.74 Justice Powell announced the decision of
the Court and rendered a plurality opinion for four justices emphasizing that
the defect of the Massachusetts law was the requirement that minors notify
their parents in all cases; provision for secret, ex-parte proceedings in which
minors might be able to convince the Court of their maturity or need for a
secret abortion was emphasized by this faction of the Court.75 Four other
concurring justices, however, took the position that the defect in the
Massachusetts scheme was the requirement of third party consent (either
parental or judicial) in all cases.76 Justice White, alone, dissented asserting:
“[u]ntil now, I would have thought inconceivable a holding that the United
States Constitution forbids even notice to parents when their minor child
who seeks surgery objects to such notice and is able to convince a judge
that the parents should be denied participation in the decision.”77
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided two cases that reconfirmed that
public funding of abortion is not required by the Constitution. In Harris v.
McRae,78 and Williams v. Zbaraz,79 the Court upheld the congressional
Hyde Amendments80 and state counterparts, which prohibited the
expenditure of funds to pay for abortions.81 The arguments that these
funding restrictions violated the Establishment Clause, the Due Process
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause were rejected, and the prior
analyses in Maher, Poelker, and Beal, were reaffirmed.82 Also, the
argument that Title XIX requires participating states to subsidize
“medically necessary” abortions, even though the Hyde Amendment
prohibits federal reimbursement, was rejected.83
The next year, in H. L. v. Matheson,84 the Supreme Court upheld a
Utah law that required doctors performing an abortion upon an unmarried
minor to notify her parents “if possible” prior to the performance of an
abortion.85 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, rejected the
challenge of an unmarried fifteen year-old minor living at home with, and
dependent upon, her parents who challenged the statute as violative of her
74. Id. at 651.
75. See id. at 642-47.
76. Id. at 653-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting)
78. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
79. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
80. Pub. L. 96–123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979).
81. Harris, 448 U.S. at 326; Williams, 448 U.S. at 368. Abortions performed to preserve the
life of the mother or in response to incest were exempt from this funding prohibition.
82. See Williams, 448 U.S. at 369.
83. Id.
84. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
85. Id. at 413.
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constitutional right of privacy.86 The Court emphasized that the Utah
statute did not authorize parental veto, merely parental notification of the
minor’s desire for abortion.87 The Court further noted that the statute was
reasonably flexible (the “if possible” language) and did not preclude the
possibility that “mature minors” might obtain abortions without parental
notification upon a showing of their emancipation.88
In 1983, the Court decided City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Incorporated,89 which invalidated substantial
proportions of a city ordinance requiring that abortions could only be
performed in a hospital after the first trimester.90 In its holding, the Court
emphasized that, as developments in medicines make abortion safer in later
periods of pregnancy, the constitutional standard enunciated in Roe must be
adjusted to permit access to those post-first-trimester abortions in low cost
abortion clinics rather than higher-cost hospitals.91 Another provision,
which required all minors under the age of fifteen to obtain parental or
judicial consent for abortion, was invalidated, and the Court emphasized
that the city could not presume that all minors under the age of fifteen are
too immature to make an abortion decision or that abortion may never be in
their best interests without parental approval.92 A detailed “informed
consent” requirement obligating the attending physician to inform his
patient of, inter alia, the development of her fetus, possible physical and
emotional complications that might result from abortion, the availability of
agencies to provide her with assistance and information regarding birth
control, adoption and childbirth, and to inform her of the particular risks
associated with her pregnancy and of the abortion technique to be
employed, were declared unconstitutional.93 The majority read the statute
as being an “in terrorem”94 statute intended to discourage abortion rather
than inform the woman sufficiently to make an intelligent choice about it.95
A provision requiring a twenty-four hour delay between the obtaining of
informed consent in the performance of an abortion was invalidated as
inconsistent with the need for speedy abortions and unnecessary to protect
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 400.
Id. at 408-09.
See id. at 408-11.
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
Id. at 452.
Id. at 434-37.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 442.
“In terrorem” is derived from Latin which means “in fear.”
DICTIONARY 896 (9th ed. 2009).
95. See id. at 450-51.
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informed consent.96 A requirement that fetal remains following an abortion
are disposed of “in a humane and sanitary manner” was likewise invalidated
because it was deemed to be unnecessary vague.97 Writing for a six justicemajority, Justice Powell reaffirmed the fundamental principles of Roe v.
Wade, and emphasized that the Court would not reconsider the core policy
decisions made in Roe.98 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, however, authored
a powerful dissenting opinion, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist,
criticizing Roe’s trimester doctrine as being “on a collision course with
itself”99 and embodying “a completely unworkable method of
accommodating the conflicting personal rights and compelling state
interests that are involved in the abortion context.”100
The Court announced its decision in Planned Parenthood Association
of Kansas City, Missouri, Incorporated. v. Ashcroft101 the same day. In that
case, the Court reiterated its holding in City of Akron that statutes requiring
all abortions performed in the second and third trimester to be done in
hospitals were unconstitutional.102 But Missouri’s requirement that a
second physician be present during the performance of post-viability
abortions was upheld as a constitutionally reasonable method of furthering
the states compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses.103
Likewise, a requirement that pathology reports be submitted in all abortion
cases was upheld as being reasonable on its face and sufficiently related to
accepted medical standards.104 Similarly, the requirement that minors
secure parental consent or judicial consent (based on a finding of maturity
or best interests) before obtaining abortions was upheld in as much as it
provided an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor could
demonstrate that she was sufficiently mature to make the decision to have
an abortion on her own or that the abortion would be in her best interests.105
Also announced the same day was the decision of the Supreme Court in
Simopoulos v. Virginia,106 which upheld the conviction of a Virginia doctor
for violating a Virginia statute making it unlawful to perform an abortion

96. Id.
97. Id. at 451-52.
98. See id. at 420.
99. Id. at 458 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 454.
101. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
102. Id. at 494.
103. Id. at 485-86.
104. Id. at 490.
105. Id. at 490-91.
106. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
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during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of a hospital.107 Evidence
indicated that he had performed an illegal abortion on an unmarried minor
by an injection of saline solution at his unlicensed clinic, that the minor had
been directed to deliver the fetus in a motel, was not advised to go to a
hospital when labor began, and aborted the child alone in the motel.108
Licensed abortion clinics were deemed “hospitals” for purpose of the
statute, and the Court upheld the requirement that second trimester
abortions be performed in such licensed facilities.109
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.110 This case involved a Pennsylvania
statute enacted post-Colautti found invalid — which required that a woman
be informed of the name of the physician who had performed the abortion,
the “particular medical risks” of the abortion procedure to be used, the risks
of childbirth, the possibility of detrimental physical and psychological
effects of medical assistance, benefits available for childbirth and prenatal
care, the fact that the father would be liable for assistance in supporting the
child, and of agencies offering alternatives to abortion.111 Justice
Blackmun, for the Court, sharply condemned the provisions as designed to
deter the exercise of freedom of choice.112 A requirement of disclosure of
facts of fetal development was also invalidated after Justice Blackmun
characterized them as nothing less than an attempt to discourage abortion
and intrude into the privacy of the woman and her physician.113 Other
provisions were impermissibly designed to protect the life and interests of
the viable fetus subject to abortion.114 The majority also invalidated
requirements that the physician performing post viability abortions exercise
the degree of care required to preserve the life and health of an unborn child
intended to be born alive, that a physician must use the abortion technique
that would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be born alive
unless it would present a significantly greater medical risk to the woman’s
life or health, and that a second physician be present during the
performance of an abortion when the fetus was possibly viable.115 Having
condemned what it considered the wrongful intent of the Pennsylvania
legislature, the majority refused to accept the state’s good faith construction
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 519.
Id. at 508-09.
Id. at 518-19.
476 U.S. 747 (1986).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 759-63.
Id. at 769-71.
Id.
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of the statute, and found that it required pregnant women to bear increased
medical risks in order to save viable fetuses, failed to explicitly contain a
medical-emergency exception, and curtailed the performance of post
viability abortions — all in contravention of the fundamental right of
abortion privacy.116 Four justices dissented, including Chief Justice Burger
— who had joined the majority in Roe that rejected claims that Roe would
lead to extreme and extensive judicial doctrines protecting abortion. Chief
Justice Burger expressed his regret that he had been wrong about such a
predication, and for the first time, called for reconsideration of Roe v.
Wade.117
After Justice Powell’s resignation in 1987, with only eight Justices
sitting, the Court decided Hartigan v. Zbaraz118 by an equally divided fourto-four decision. The Court affirmed a court of appeals split judgment
invalidating an Illinois statute requiring physicians to wait twenty-four
hours after notifying the parents of minors seeking an abortion before
performing the abortion on the minor.119 The Illinois law incorporated
exceptions including judicial bypass provisions conforming to the Bellotti
(II) standards.120
Akron, Thornburgh and Zbaraz represent the zenith of the intellectually
turgid, doctrinally rigid pro-abortion jurisprudence as the Supreme Court
struck down some common-sense regulations of a medical procedure that is
not only fraught with medical risk, but is extremely perilous to individuals
— especially vulnerable, desperate young women who discover that they
have an unplanned, unexpected, or unwanted pregnancy — and to families.
For a decade and a half, Justice Blackmun, who considered himself to be
the medical expert on the Court, had successfully pressed the Court to view
abortion only from the technical-medical perspective of a comparatively
simple medical procedure and to exclude consideration of the profound
moral, ethical, pacifist, child-protective, familial, social, cultural, and other
normative dimensions. The record of the Court adopting that narrow
perspective peaked by 1986, and while it re-emerged occasionally in some
opinions, and while in some areas the abortion doctrine continued to
expand, the relentless force of the abortion doctrine began to wane fifteen
years after the Court decided Roe.

116. Id. at 772.
117. Id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
118. 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (per curiam).
119. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff’d 763 F.2d 1532
(7th Cir. 1985).
120. Id.
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A significant shift in the abortion doctrine occurred in 1989 when the
Court decided Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.121 Here, the
Supreme Court upheld four provisions of a Missouri abortion law that had
been invalidated by a federal court of appeals and district court.122 The
Missouri statute included a preamble declaring legislative policy that “the
life of each human being begins at conception.”123 The lower courts found
that this official declaration was inconsistent with dicta in Roe, City of
Akron, and Thornburgh in that a state may not adopt a theory regarding
when life begins.124 The Court in Webster, however, explained that Roe’s
dicta only meant that the adoption by a state of such a theory did not justify
abortion restrictions.125 Moreover, other cases had held that the state is free
to favor childbirth over abortion.126 Missouri’s provisions prohibiting the
expenditure of public funds, the use of public facilities, or the work of
public employees to perform or encourage abortions not necessary to save
the life of the mother also were upheld under the precedents established in
Maher, Poelker, and McRae.127 The Court emphasized that a state is not
required to get or stay in the abortion business, and may restrict the use of
public resources.128 The majority also accepted Missouri’s interpretation of
provisions requiring certain medical tests to determine if a fetus of twenty
weeks gestation or more is viable as not being required if they would be
medically useless.129 As construed, four justices found that these provisions
conflicted with the Roe trimester scheme, and proposed to eliminate the
trimester scheme.130 Four other justices said that the Missouri abortion
provisions violated the Roe trimester scheme, and should be invalidated.131
One justice, Justice O’Connor, found that the provisions did not conflict
with any precedents, and upheld them without deciding whether to revise
the Roe trimester doctrine.132
Webster was the most intensely watched Supreme Court case in
many years. More amicus curiae briefs were filed in that case (seventy-

121. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
122. Id. at 522.
123. Id. at 504 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)).
124. Id. at 504-05.
125. Id. at 506-07.
126. Id. at 506.
127. Id. at 508-10.
128. Id. at 509-10.
129. Id. at 514-21.
130. Id. at 494.
131. Id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 561
(Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 525-26 (O’Connor J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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eight) than in any previous case heard by the Supreme Court,133 and the
Court received cartful’s of mail expressing opinions on the involved
abortion issues.134 While the decision in Webster “turned the corner” and
unequivocally moved away from the Roe doctrine, the movement was
small, the judgment of the Court was quite narrow, and the Court did not
overturn Roe. But the very fact that the Webster decision was so modest
and narrow signaled that the era of constitutional adjudication characterized
by abrupt and profound changes in constitutional doctrine (of which Roe is
the prime example) was over. Moreover, the Court clearly signaled that
more deference would be accorded to state legislatures regarding abortion
regulations than had previously been permitted by the federal courts under
Roe.
In 1990, the Supreme Court extended the trend toward deference to the
reasonable regulations and restrictions of abortion adopted by state
legislatures when it decided two parental participation cases: Hodgson v.
Minnesota135 and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (“Akron
II”).136 In Akron II, the Court upheld, by a six to three vote, an Ohio law
generally requiring that a parent be notified twenty-four hours before an
abortion is performed on a minor child, unless judicial bypass was
obtained.137 In Hodgson, the Court struck down a two-parent notification
requirement without a judicial bypass provision,138 but upheld the same
requirement with a judicial bypass provision.139 Four justices in Hodgson
indicated that a two-parent notification requirement would be upheld with
or without judicial bypass on the ground that parental notification is
distinguishable from, and less burdensome than, a parental consent
requirement.140 Four justices characterized the two-parent notification as
irrational because of the prevalence of divorced, separated, and other singleparent families.141 These justices asserted that it would be unconstitutional
even with judicial bypass. 142 Justice O’Connor held that a two-parent
requirement with judicial bypass is constitutional; without judicial bypass,

133. See Susan Behuniak-Long, Friendly-Fire: Amici Curiae and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services. 74 JUDICATURE 261, 261 (1991).
134. Id. at 535 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
135. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
136. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
137. Id. at 506-07.
138. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 422.
139. Id. at 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 479-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 452 (plurality opinion).
142. Id..
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it is unconstitutional.143 The Court had no occasion to decide whether a
one-parent notification requirement without judicial bypass is
constitutional.
In the 1991 decision of Rust v. Sullivan,144 the Court upheld the Title X
regulations enacted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the
“Secretary”) in 1988, which prohibited recipients of federal family planning
funds from counseling, referring for, encouraging, or promoting abortion,
and required family planning fund recipients to be financially and
physically separate from abortion providers.145 In Rust, recipients of the
federal funds challenged these so-called “gag rules,” but the district court in
New York and Second Circuit upheld the regulations,146 as did the Supreme
Court. Writing for a majority of five justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist first
held the regulations were not inconsistent with the intent of Congress.147
Section 1008 of the Family Planning Act (Title X) provides: “[n]one of the
funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning.”148 The interpretation of the
statute by the agency was entitled to judicial deference, even if it was not
the only permissible reading of the statute and even though it was not
The General
identical with the Secretary’s original regulations.149
Accounting Office and Office of the Inspector General reports of abuses
(family planning clinics operating in the same facilities as and acting as
feeders for abortion clinics) provided ample justification for the 1988
revised regulations.150 Next, the Court concluded that the regulations did
not raise the sort of grave and doubtful constitutional questions that would
warrant invalidation of the regulations merely to avoid the possibility that
the interpretation of the statute under which they could be upheld might be
unconstitutional.151 Citing Maher and five other abortion funding cases, the
Court also rejected Petitioners’ argument that the regulations violated the
First Amendment by discriminating on the basis of viewpoint in prohibiting
all discussion about abortion.152 The counseling and advocacy restrictions

143. Id. at 461 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part).
144. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
145. Id. at 177-78.
146. Id. at 181 (citing New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 889
F.2d 401 (1989)).
147. Id. at 203.
148. Id. at 195, n.4. (citing Grants for Family Planning Serv., 42 CFR §§ 59.8(a)(2),
59.5(b)(1) (1989)).
149. Id. at 184.
150. Id. at 187.
151. Id. at 191.
152. Id. at 192-94.
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were merely designed to ensure that the limits of the Title X program were
properly observed.153 Selectively funding a program to encourage certain
activities in the public interest, without funding alternative activities or
programs, is not impermissible viewpoint discrimination.154 For instance,
“[w]hen Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was not
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of
political philosophy such as communism and fascism.”155 Moreover, the
regulations did not prohibit pro-abortion counseling and advocacy by Title
X grantees and off-the-job employees, only such speech for on-the-job
employees.156 Finally, the Court summarily rejected the petitioners’
assertion that the Fifth Amendment protects a woman’s right to choose
whether to terminate her pregnancy.157 The Due Process Clause only
restricts governmental deprivation; it does not compel affirmative
governmental assistance to secure protected liberties.158 “The government
has no affirmative duty to ‘commit any resources to facilitating
abortions . . . .’“159 There were three dissenting opinions in Rust. Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, with Justice Stevens separately
agreeing, would have invalidated the regulations on both statutory and
constitutional grounds.160 Justice O’Connor would have invalidated solely
on statutory grounds.161
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,162 the
Court reached another milestone in its saga of confusing abortion
jurisprudence. The Casey decision was closely watched because the parties
had urged the Court to either entirely overturn or endorse Roe v. Wade.163
It did neither, but rendered a very long decision (the slip opinion was over
165 pages) with five separate opinions, none of them supported by a
majority of the Court on all of the issues.164 Three justices—O’Connor,

153. Id.
154. Id. at 193.
155. Id. at 194.
156. Id. at 198-99.
157. Id. at 201-02.
158. Id. at 201.
159. Id. (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989).
160. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 223-24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
162. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
163. See Brief for Respondents at 117, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (No. 91-744); Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 62, Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744).
164. See Casey. 505 U.S. at 843-44.
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Kennedy, and Souter—jointly authored the Court’s opinion.165 Some parts
of the joint opinion were also signed by two justices— Blackmun and
Stevens—who agreed with the joint opinion on some points and disagreed
(each in his own separate opinion) on other points.166 Four others
justices—Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas—agreed with most results
of the joint opinion, but not with the rationale; all four justices signed two
dissenting opinions—one written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and the other
by Justice Scalia.167
In Casey, the Court upheld four of five challenged Pennsylvania
abortion regulations. First, the Court held that Pennsylvania’s informed
consent requirement was constitutional, but the Court subdivided the
informed consent provision three ways, and upheld each part with different
alliances and different analyses. First, by a vote of eight to one (only
Justice Blackmun dissenting), the Court upheld the requirement that the
physician doing the abortion inform a woman of the nature of the
procedure, health risks involved in abortion and childbirth, and gestational
age of the unborn child. Four justices—Rehnquist, White, Scalia and
Thomas—found that it was valid because it was rationally related to the
legitimate state interest in assuring that a woman’s consent to abortion be a
fully informed decision.168 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter
concluded that this provision was constitutional because it did not unduly
burden a woman’s abortion decision.169 Justice Stevens wrote that it was
valid under the Roe strict scrutiny trimester standard (the highest possible
standard of review) because it was a “neutral requirement.”170 Justice
Blackmun, alone, would have held it unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny.171 That Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe and the most
aggressive, insistent, passionate defender and expander of the Roe doctrine
of abortion-on-demand, was alone in his dissent clearly signaled the end of
an era—the era of automatic Supreme Court protection of, and cheerleading for, abortion-on-demand.
By a vote of seven to two, the Court upheld the requirement that either
the doctor or an assistant inform the woman of the availability of printed
materials describing the fetus, giving information about medical assistance
165. Id.
166. Id. at 844.
167. Id. at 944, 979. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 967 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
169. Id. at 881-87 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 917-18 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 925-26 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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for childbirth and child support, and a list of agencies that provide
alternatives to abortion, including adoption. The Rehnquist-four again held
that this was rationally related to the legitimate state interest in assuring that
a woman’s consent to abortion be a fully informed decision.172 The
O’Connor-three again concluded that it did not unduly burden a woman’s
abortion decision because it would not have a “severely adverse” effect on a
woman’s abortion choice.173 In separate opinions, Blackmun and Stevens
dissented because the requirement violated precedents decided under the
strict scrutiny standard of review.174 The mandatory twenty-four hour
waiting period was upheld by the same fragmented four175 plus three176
minus one177 minus one178 vote. The fact that no one would join Justice
Blackmun’s dissent was evidence that the Blackmun-led era of knee-jerk
judicial invalidation of abortion restrictions by the Supreme Court was over.
Second, in Casey, the Court unanimously held that Pennsylvania’s
medical emergency provision—which provided an exception to certain
regulations in cases of medical emergencies—was constitutional. Five
justices signed the joint opinion agreeing that it did not impose an undue
burden on access to abortion.179 Four justices wrote that it was valid under
rational relation analysis as reasonably interpreted by the court of
appeals.180 Third, Pennsylvania’s parental consent provision was upheld by
eight votes, and each of the three supporting opinions garnering such votes
cited the numerous past decisions holding that parental participation
furthers the important governmental interest in the welfare of minors.181
Justice Blackmun—again alone—dissented by arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny because it could delay abortions for
minors.182 Finally, with an eight to one vote, the Court upheld most of the
172. Id. at 966-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
173. Id. at 883-84 (majority opinion).
174. Id. at 934-935 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part); id. at 917 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. Id. at 969-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
176. Id. at 886-87 (majority opinion).
177. Id. at 918 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
178. Id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
179. Id. at 878-880 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 977-979 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part)..
181. Id. at 895 (majority opinion); id. at 971(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
182. Id. at 938 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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public and confidential reporting and record-keeping requirements by
simply relying on past precedents.183 Justice Blackmun, alone, dissented.184
The only abortion regulation the Supreme Court struck down in
Casey, by the close vote of 5-4, was Pennsylvania’s spousal notification
requirement. The law, which required married women to notify their
husbands, contained exceptions covering pregnancy by a non-husband,
sexual assault, inability to locate the husband, fear of physical abuse, or
medical emergency.185 Nonetheless, the joint opinion, signed this time by
five justices (the triumvirate186 plus Blackmun187 and Stevens188) concluded
that it unduly burdened the right of married women to obtain abortions
because spousal abuse is a serious problem and because mandatory
notification to a husband of his wife’s desire to have an abortion is
“repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the
rights secured by the Constitution”—which protects the rights of
individuals against families.189 Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White,
Scalia, and Thomas in dissent, would have upheld the requirement by
distinguishing mere notification from spousal consent, and because spousal
notification rationally furthers state interests in protecting a husband’s
interest in the potential life of his unborn child, in protecting the potential
life of the fetus, and in promoting the integrity of the marriage
relationship.190
The joint opinion for the Court in Casey explicitly reaffirmed key parts
of the Roe doctrine, including the principle that the Constitution protects the
decision of pregnant women in having abortion (now described as a “liberty
interest” rather than a “privacy” interest, perhaps because of the
incoherence of describing as “private” a decision to authorize a medical
procedure performed by one person, upon another person, that ends the life
of a third human being), and that direct prohibitions of abortion before the
fetus is viable are unconstitutional.191 However, the joint opinion also
explicitly repudiated the trimester scheme and the “overreaching” of some
183. Id. at 900-01 (majority opinion); id. at 976-77 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
184. Id. at 939-40 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
185. Id. at 887-88 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 895.
187. Id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
188. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. at 898 (majority opinion).
190. Id. at 974-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
191. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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abortion decisions (including Akron I, and Thornburgh),192 and announced a
new test—the “undue burden” test—to replace the former “strict scrutiny”
test in abortion cases.193 Two justices, Blackmun194 and Stevens,195 joined
the joint opinion in reaffirming part of Roe, but declined to repudiate any of
the prior cases and insisted that the old strict scrutiny test continue to be
applied.196 Four other justices, Rehnquist, White, Scalia and Thomas,
explicitly opined that Roe should be entirely overturned and that abortion
restrictions should be analyzed under ordinary “rational relation”
analysis.197
In 1993 and 1994, abortion protests were the subject of the major
Supreme Court abortion decisions. In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic,198 abortion clinics and pro-abortion organizations filed suit in
federal court against anti-abortion demonstrators and a group that organized
demonstrations against abortion clinics seeking to enjoin them from
protesting outside clinics in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area. The
plaintiff asserted three claims, including an alleged violation of a federal
civil rights law that prohibits conspiracy to deprive “any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the law”199 as well as two pendant state law claims—
trespass and public nuisance.200 The district agreed, and enjoined
defendants from trespassing or obstructing access to the clinics and ordered
them to pay plaintiffs’ costs and attorneys’ fees.201 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed.202 The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part.203
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that women seeking abortions
do not constitute a “class” protected by the federal statute and that
opposition to abortion does not constitute animus against women in
general.204 Justice Scalia wrote, “[w]hatever one thinks of abortion, it
cannot be denied that there are common and respectable reasons for
192. Id. at 872.
193. Id. at 874-77.
194. Id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
196. See id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
197. Id. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
198. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
200. Bray, 506 U.S. at 267.
201. Nat’l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989).
202. Nat’l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990).
203. Bray, 506 U.S. at 287.
204. Id. at 274.
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opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward . . . women as a
class — as is evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of
the issue . . . .”205 Moreover, Justice Scalia emphasized that disfavoring
abortion was not considered to be ipso facto sex discrimination, and that the
defendants lacked the required “intent” to discriminate against women
because their demonstrations were intended to protect the victims of
abortion, stop abortion, and reverse its legalization.206 The “hindrance”
prong of section 1985 would fail for similar reasons.207
Because plaintiffs could not prevail under section 1985, the Bray court
held that they were not entitled to attorneys’ fees.208 The plaintiff’s federal
claims, however, were not so insubstantial as to deprive the federal court of
jurisdiction over the pendant state law claims, so the case was remanded.209
Concurring, Justice Kennedy noted that another federal statute, 42 U.S.C.
section 10501 requesting assistance from the U.S. Attorney General, might
apply.210 Dissenting, Justices Souter (alone),211 Stevens (with Blackmun
joining),212 and O’Connor (with Blackmun joining),213 filed separate
opinions asserting disparate interpretations of section 1985 under which the
defendant’s might have been liable.
In 1994, the Court decided National Organization for Women,
Incorporated v. Scheidler,214 which involved another abortion protester
issue. Abortion clinics and organizations that support abortion rights filed
suit in federal court against anti-abortion organizations and individuals
alleging that they were engaged in a conspiracy in violation of federal
antitrust laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”).215 The district court dismissed the antitrust claims on the ground
that the activities involved political action, not commercial competition, and
dismissed the RICO claims on the ground that, even though the plaintiffs
alleged predicate illegal acts (such as violation of the Hobbs Act), RICO
requires an “economic motive” of profit, and the abortion demonstrators

205. Id. at 270.
206. Id. at 274. In addition, Justice Scalia pointed out that the demonstrations were not
“aimed at” interfering with the right of interstate travel, and the right to abortion is not among the
few rights protected against purely private conspiracies. Id. at 276-78.
207. Id. at 279-85.
208. Id. at 285.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 287-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 288 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
212. Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 345 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
214. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
215. Id. at 252-53.
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lacked such a motive.216 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of both counts.217 Reviewing the RICO dismissal only, a
unanimous Supreme Court reversed, ruling that an “economic motive” for
profit is not required to allege a violation of RICO.218 The Court ruled that
the clinics had standing to bring RICO claims because they alleged facts—
i.e., illegal violence was used to shut down the clinic—which, if proved,
could justify the relief they sought.219 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
then held that “[n]owhere in either [section] 1962(c), or in the RICO
definitions in [section] 1961, is there any indication that an economic
motive is required.”220 The phrase “affect commerce” was broad enough to
include acts done without an economic motive.221 In addition, the Court did
not believe that the term “enterprise” implied that an economic motive was
required.222 Although the congressional statement of findings prefacing
RICO refers draining billions of dollars from the economy, that “thin reed”
of general legislative concern did not suggest that personal benefit to the
actor was a predicate.223 Congress could have clearly included an economic
motive requirement, but did not.224 Department of Justice guidelines in
1981 referring to economic motive were not persuasive because they were
amended only three years later.225 Finding the statutory language
“unambiguous” and that the legislative history contained no “clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary” the court rejected the protesters’
and lower courts’ construction of the RICO law.226 Justice Souter (joined
by Justice Kennedy) wrote an additional opinion to emphasize that “RICO
actions could deter protected advocacy and to caution courts applying
RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interests that could be at
stake.”227
The same year, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Incorporated,228
the Court significantly curtailed a broad injunction that had been issued
against abortion clinic protesters.229 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 941 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1992).
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 510 U.S. at 262.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 259-61.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
Id. at 265 (Souter, J., concurring).
512 U.S. 753 (1994).
Id. at 757.
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opinion for the Court (part for five justices and part for six justices).230 A
Florida state court entered an injunction against abortion protestors
blocking access to an abortion clinic entrances and against physically
abusing people entering or leaving the clinic.231 Six months later, finding
that the first injunction had been violated, causing physical harm to some
persons and discouraging potential patients, the court issued a broader
injunction including nine restraints.232 The demonstrators objected to four
of the restrictions on their public expression of opposition to abortion and to
the abortion clinic.233 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the injunction,234
but in a separate case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated
it.235
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld a few narrow provisions, but held that
most of the injunction unconstitutionally infringed upon the First
Amendment rights of abortion protesters.236 The Court first rejected the
argument that the injunction was content or viewpoint based.237 Next, the
court stated that, because every injunction singles out a group on the basis
of its past actions, the failure to similarly enjoin pro-abortion demonstrators
was not improper because they had not engaged in those disruptive actions;
the restraint of the demonstrators was “incidental to their antiabortion
message because they repeatedly violated the court’s original order.”238
Because the restriction of speech was an injunction rather than a statute, a
“somewhat more stringent” standard applied (“whether the challenged
provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve
a significant government interest”) than would have applied to a statute.239
But strict scrutiny was not necessary.240 The public sidewalk was a “public
forum.”241 The Court also agreed that numerous significant governmental
interests justified an appropriately tailored injunction, including protecting
property rights, free flow of traffic, public safety and order, protecting
women’s freedom to seek lawful medical and counseling services for
pregnancy, and the well-being of the patients.242
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 758-61.
Id. at 768-76.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 761-62.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 763-64.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 765.
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The Court, however, concluded that most of the challenged provisions
of the injunction were overbroad. First, the injunction prohibited protestors
from “congregating [or] picketing” within 36-feet of most of the clinic
property.243 The thirty-six feet buffer zone was reasonable as applied to
clinic driveways and entrances because the court found (and respondents
did not contest) that demonstrators had repeatedly blocked both.244 Second,
the court held that as applied to bar demonstrators from picketing on
adjacent private property, absent any evidence any traffic was blocked, the
thirty-six foot buffer zone “fail[ed] to serve the significant governmental
interests” and was stricken.245 Third, the court upheld the injunction
barring “singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns,
auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds . . . within
earshot of the patients inside the clinic” during clinic hours because noise
can create stress and health risks in a medical setting.246 The injunction
also prohibited protesters displaying “images observable . . . [by] patients
inside” the clinic, but the Court found that the proper remedy if patients
found visual images displayed by protesters disturbing was for the clinic to
“pull its curtains,” and the Court held that this provision “violate[d] the
First Amendment.”247 The injunction also prohibited protesters from
approaching any person within a three hundred foot bubble zone around the
clinic unless invited by the person to do so.248 The Supreme Court,
however, struck this because the prior consent requirement was
impermissible and this provision “burden[ed] more speech than is necessary
to prevent intimidation and ensure access to the clinic.”249 Finally, the
injunction prohibited picketing or using sound amplification equipment
within a three hundred foot bubble zone of the residences of clinic staff.250
The Court upheld the sound equipment restriction, but struck down the
picketing ban because the three hundred foot zone was much greater than
necessary to protect the neighborhood.251 Moreover, the court rejected the
challenge to the “in concert” language in the injunction for lack of standing,
noting that freedom of association to express a viewpoint was permitted,
but collaboration to deprive others of lawful rights was not.252 Justice
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 768.
Id. at 769-70.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 772-73.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 775-76.
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Souter joined the Court’s opinion, but added that claims against those
acting “in concert” would be decided on a case-by-case basis without regard
to viewpoint.253 According to Justice Stevens, he would: apply a lower
standard of review to injunctions than to statutes;254 uphold the three
hundred foot bubble zone against unbidden approaching because
“approaching” is conduct as well as speech;255 and refrain from deciding the
other issues (though Justice Stevens was “inclined to agree with the Court’s
resolution respecting the noise and images restrictions.”).256
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, agreed with the
Court’s invalidation of portions of the injunction, but would have gone
further and invalidated the entire injunction.257 They first argued that the
injunction “departs so far from the established course of our jurisprudence
that in any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate for
summary reversal.”258 These three justices would hold the application of
the thirty-six foot zone and noise restriction “to [anti-abortion protestors]
alone” is impermissible.259 After describing a video of the demonstrations,
Justice Scalia emphasized that the Florida judge that issued the injunction
himself acknowledged that the injunction was limited on the basis of
viewpoint.260 The Court’s “intermediate-intermediate” standard of review
was a departure from accepted prior restraint standards.261
Justice Scalia also disputed the assertion that the first injunction had
been violated, noting that the evidence only showed that the flow of traffic
had been slowed a little, not a finding of any intentional blocking of traffic,
and just one incident in which the protestors “took their time to get out of
the way.”262 Moreover, the pro-abortion protestors made more noise than
the anti-abortion protestors, and the injunction was not the narrowest
possible restraint.263 As a result, all nine justices agreed that at least some
parts of the injunction were unconstitutionally overbroad infringements of
free speech. Six justices agreed that at least some parts of the injunction
were constitutionally permissible.264 Three justices would have overturned
253. Id. at 776-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. Id. at 777.
256. Id. at 784.
257. Id. at 784-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
258. Id. at 785.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 794-97.
261. See id. at 790-91.
262. Id. at 807.
263. Id. at 809-10, 813.
264. Id. at 776 (majority opinion); id. at 776-77 (Souter, J., concurring); id at 784.(Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the entire injunction as violating the First Amendment.265 Only one justice,
Stevens, would have upheld more of the injunction than the Court
upheld.266 Thus, Madsen was a major turning point in the abortion
jurisprudence of the Court, finally signaling that the Court was clearly
willing to extend ordinary First Amendment protections to the rights of
expression of anti-abortion protesters.
In Leavitt v. Jane L.,267 the Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision that
had ruled that a Utah abortion law was not severable under Utah law and
was unconstitutional in its entirety.268 A federal district court invalidated
part of the Utah law restricting abortions before twenty weeks gestation, but
upheld the part of the law that restricted abortions after twenty weeks
gestation, finding that the latter portion was severable under state law.269
While the Supreme Court normally does not review interpretations of state
law, this decision amounted to such a blatant federal court nullification of
clear state law allowing severability that a five to four majority of the Court
ruled, per curiam, that the law was severable, and the Court remanded the
case for further proceedings.270
In Lambert v. Wicklund,271 the Court, per curiam, reversed the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and a United States district court that invalidated a
Montana parental notice law.272 The law at issue required that one parent
be notified forty-eight hours before performance of an abortion unless a
court waived the requirement on showing that: (1) the minor was
“sufficiently mature,” or; (2) she had been the victim of a pattern of parental
physical, sexual, or emotional abuse, or; (3) parental notification was “not
in the best interests of the minor.”273 When doctors challenged the law, the
district court struck it down, finding that the third possible waiver was too
narrow because it did not specify that the waiver could be judicially granted
when abortion was not in the minor’s best interest—not just when
notification was not in the minor’s best interest.274 The court of appeals
placed heavy reliance on its earlier decision in Glick v. McKay,275 in which
the court had invalidated Nevada’s parental notification rule on similar
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 815 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 782 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
518 U.S. 137 (1996) (per curiam).
Id. at 137-38 (citing Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1499 (1995)).
Id. at 138-39 (citing Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 870 (1992)).
Id. at 146.
520 U.S. 292 (1997) (per curiam).
Id. at 293.
Id. at 293-94 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204 (1995)).
Id. at 294.
937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991).
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grounds.276 The Supreme Court noted that its prior decisions had never
determined whether judicial bypass is necessary when the statute merely
requires parental notification (instead of parental consent), criticized the
Glick decision, and found that the “best interests” exception encompassed
both the benefits from abortion and harm from notification.277 The Court
observed that Akron II was based upon an assumption that a judicial bypass
when notification is not in the minor’s best interest “is equivalent to”
judicial bypass based on showing “that abortion is not in her best
Justice Stevens, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer,
interests . . . .”278
concurred because the Montana statute was “essentially identical” to the
statute upheld in Akron II, but noted that either “best interest” showing
would justify judicial bypass, a showing of both was not necessary.279
In Mazurek v. Armstrong,280 the Court, per curiam, also upheld a
Montana law restricting the performance of abortion to licensed physicians,
which was similar to laws in forty other states.281 The district court denied
a motion for preliminary injunction when a physician-assistant and several
doctors challenged the law.282 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
that judgment, finding the plaintiffs had a fair chance of success on the
merits.283 Here, the Supreme Court reiterated its determination in Casey
that there was no evidence that requiring a doctor to perform the abortion
amounted to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.284 It
also rejected the Court of Appeals conclusion that the law was invalid
because the legislature had impermissibly intended to create such an
obstacle, noting the absence of proof of that alleged motive; the fact that an
anti-abortion group drafted the law did not mean the legislature had illegal
motive.285 The Court’s precedents dating back to Roe v. Wade had upheld
similar requirements.286 While reversal of an interlocutory judgment is
unusual, because the error was clear and the effect in Montana immediate,
the Court reversed.287 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, dissented, arguing that the error was not sufficiently important to

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Lambert, 520 U.S. at 294-95.
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justify interlocutory review and finding that the law was aimed specifically
at one person—the physician-assistant—and designed to make abortion
more difficult.288
From 1973 until the late 1990s, the Court declined to review restraints
on anti-abortion free speech in cases that seemed to be contrary to prior
rulings of the Court. In Lawson v. Murray, the Court denied a petition for
certiorari from a New Jersey prior restraint order against anti-abortion
protestors picketing within three hundred feet of the residence of an
abortion provider, even though the court found that the picketing was
peaceful and all tort claims against the protestors had been denied.289 Just
the year before in Madsen, the Court had explicitly struck down an
injunction against picketing within three hundred feet of the residence of
abortion clinic staff under the justification that the injunction was
overbroad.290 Scalia’s concurrence warned that the suppression of the First
Amendment rights of pro-life activists was developing “more quickly and
more severely than . . . feared,”291 and he cautioned that “[t]he danger that
speech-restricting injunctions may serve as a powerful means to suppress
disfavored views” especially when “the defendant’s prior speech (and
proposed future speech) has been expressly found not to constitute a crime
or common law tort.”292 Nonetheless, he concurred in denying certiorari
because of a technical problem and because he was convinced that antiabortion protesters are “the currently disfavored class” of litigants in the
Supreme Court.293
Three years later, in Lawson v. Murray,294 the Court again denied
certiorari in a reincarnation of the same case. In this case, a New Jersey
court enjoined peaceful pro-life picketers “from carrying signs with
generalized anti-abortion messages, and signs identifying the respondent as
an abortionist” alongside a public street in front of the large, well-set-back
home of an abortion doctor, except for picketing by small groups “no more
than one hour every two weeks, and only if the police department is given
[twenty-four] hours’ notice.”295 No “violence, disruption of traffic, or other
tortious or unlawful activity” had been threatened or had occurred.296
Concurring in the denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia commented that the
288.
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290.
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292.
293.
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injunction “makes a mockery of First Amendment law” and imposed “a
degree of restriction upon free speech that [wa]s unparalleled in the
opinions of this Court.”297 However, the “captive audience” doctrine again
made it difficult to reach the prior restraint issue, and he warned that prolife protestors could not expect to receive protection for their First
Amendment rights from the current Court: “experience suggests that
seeking to bring the First Amendment to the assistance of abortion
protesters is more likely to harm the former than help the latter.”298
In 2000, the Court decided another major freedom of expression case,
Hill v. Colorado.299 In this case, pro-life abortion protestors sought a
declaratory judgment and injunction against a Colorado statute that forbade
anyone from knowingly approaching within eight feet of another person
without that person’s consent for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill
to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling
with such other person within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic.300 The
state courts denied relief on motion for summary judgment,301 but, in 1997,
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Schenck.302 The state courts again upheld the statute,303 and the
Supreme Court affirmed, six to three. Justice Stevens wrote the majority
opinion. He distinguishing Schenck, and found the statute to be “contentneutral,” a valid “time, place and manner” regulation, not overbroad, not
unreasonably vague, and not a prior restraint.304 However, four of the
justices in the majority—Souter, O’Connor, Ginsberg, and Breyer—signed
a separate concurring opinion, which emphasized somewhat different
perspectives, including the importance of the state interest in protecting
people in the one hundred foot zone.305 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, dissented, and characterized the majority decision as an attack on
fundamental individual expression rights, noting that,”[h]aving deprived
abortion opponents of the political right to persuade the electorate that
abortion should be restricted by law, the Court today continues and expands
its assault upon their individual right to persuade women contemplating

297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
300. Id. at 707-08 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999)).
301. See Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 672 (Colo. App. 1995); see also Hill v.
Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1259 (Colo. 1999).
302. Hill v. Colorado, 519 U. S. 1145, 1145 (1997).
303. Hill v. City of Lakewood, 949 P.2d 107, 109 (Colo. App. 1998).
304. See generally Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-35.
305. See id. at 735-40 (Souter, J., concurring).

448

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:415

abortion that what they are doing is wrong.”306 Justice Kennedy separately
dissented, complaining that the holding “contradicts more than a half
century of well-established First Amendment principles. For the first time
the Court approves a law which bars a private citizen from passing a
message, in a peaceful manner and on a profound moral issue, to a fellow
citizen on a public sidewalk.”307
The same day that Hill was announced, the Court also decided the
controversial case of Stenberg v. Carhart.308 Here, by a vote of five to four,
the Court affirmed the ruling of the lower federal courts—which had ruled
that a Nebraska statute banning “partial birth abortion”309 was
unconstitutional.310 Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the Court, and
found the statute unconstitutional because it did not contain an exception
for the life of the mother311 and because it unduly burdened the right to
abortion because it might be interpreted to apply to ordinary abortion
procedures.312 Three of the justices in the majority also signed concurring
opinions. Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg each filed a concurring
opinion and joined in each other’s opinion.313 Justice O’Connor filed a
separate concurring opinion.314 All four dissenters filed separate opinions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that he considered Casey wrongly decided
and wrongly applied in this case.315 Justice Scalia argued that the “undue
burden” test was unworkable, and called for overruling Casey.316 Justice
Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, argued that the statute put no undue burden
on abortion.317 Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Scalia, asserted that the majority failed to interpret the statute according to
its plain meaning, and the statute was capable of a narrowing
construction.318
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided two other significant abortion
cases. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,319
concerned the New Hampshire Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act,
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which required forty-eight-hour prior notification by a doctor to parents of a
minor before performing an abortion on the minor unless the doctor found
that the abortion was necessary to save her life, but it also allowed a minor
to petition a court for judicial bypass (approval of abortion without parental
notification if the minor is mature or the abortion is in her best interests).320
The federal district court agreed with Planned Parenthood’s claim that the
Act was unconstitutional because it did not allow a doctor to perform an
abortion without parental notification if necessary to protect the health of
the minor, and the court enjoined its enforcement.321 The Supreme Court
unanimously vacated and remanded, noting that the record showed that the
number of cases in which the law might be unconstitutional as applied was
so small that it was not clear that the law would be facially
unconstitutional.322
In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Incorporated,323 the
Court reversed and remanded lower federal courts judgments finding that
Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters had violated RICO and ordering
them to pay damages and enjoining them from engaging in anti-abortion
protests anywhere in the country.324 The Supreme Court ruled that physical
violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside RICO’s (Hobbs Act)
scope because Congress did not intend to create a freestanding physical
violence offense.325 It did intend to forbid acts or threats of physical
violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage in what the Act refers
to as robbery or extortion (and related attempts or conspiracies), which were
not proven in this case.326
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued two major decisions related to
abortion. In Gonzales v. Carhart,327 the Court upheld a federal law
prohibiting “partial birth abortion.”328 The five to four majority opinion of
Justice Kennedy emphasized that Casey had vindicated the government’s
strong interest in protecting prenatal human life and the brutal and
320. Id. at 323-24 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132:24-132:28 (2004)).
321. Id. at 325 (citing Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65
(D.N.H. 2003)).
322. Id. at 332. The New Hampshire legislature repealed the law after the Supreme Court
decision. See Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.N.H. 2008).
323. 547 U.S. 9 (2006).
324. Id. at 14-15 (detailing the procedural history and factual background of the case).
325. Id. at 17-23.
326. Id. at 23 (explaining, “Congress did not intend to create a freestanding physical violence
offense in the Hobbs Act. It did intend to forbid acts or threats of physical violence in furtherance
of a plan or purpose to engage in what the statute refers to as robbery or extortion (and related
attempts or conspiracies).”).
327. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
328. Id. at 133.
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gruesome method of partial birth abortion clearly implicated that important
state interest.329 The Court distinguished Stenberg v. Carhart, holding that
the federal law was neither void for vagueness nor an undue burden on the
right to abortion because the federal law was drafted more narrowly than
the Nebraska, applying only to “intact D&E abortions” and not D&E
abortions generally, specific anatomical marks were included rather than
vague “substantial” language, an additional “overt act” to kill was required,
and the law contained a scienter requirement, and accidental D&E was not
covered.330 The federal law did not impose a “substantial obstacle” to lateterm pre-viable abortions, and women’s regrets coupled with doctor
reluctance to disclose details of this abortion method justified the state
regulation.331 The lack of a health exception was acceptable because both
Congressional findings and the differing lower court opinions indicated that
there is uncertainty in the medical community about whether such method
of abortion was ever necessary to protect maternal health.332 A facial attack
should not have been entertained in the first instance, but an as-applied
challenge may be brought.333
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, joined the Court’s opinion “to
reiterate . . . that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and
Roe . . . has no basis in the Constitution.”334 Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, caustically dissented, finding the case
indistinguishable from Stenberg.335 The dissenters wrote:
Today’s decision is alarming. It refuses to take Casey and
Stenberg seriously. It tolerates, indeed applauds, federal
intervention to ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and
proper in certain cases by the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG). It blurs the line, firmly drawn in
Casey, between previability and postviability abortions. And, for
the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no
exception safeguarding a woman’s health.336
While the majority opinion in Gonzales was very cautious, focused, and
narrow, and upheld a very popular regulation, it involved a matter of
extreme controversy (late-term abortions).
329.
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In a collateral decision, Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc.,337 the Supreme Court upheld an “as applied” challenge to
section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“McCain-Feingold”),
which barred electioneering advertisements within thirty days of a federal
primary or sixty days of a federal election as applied to three ads that
Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL”) intended to run less than sixty days
before an election in which Senator Feingold was running.338 The
advertisements asked citizens to call his office to ask him not to filibuster
President Bush’s judicial nominees, which the Court agreed were
constitutionally protected political speech issue advertisements, not
electioneering or the “functional equivalent.”339 The Court found no
compelling state interest justified burdening WRTL’s speech.340 While this
case did not concern the abortion doctrine per se, the context concerned
abortion speech, an area of law in which the Court had, in some past cases,
clearly distorted First Amendment doctrine with the effect, if not purpose,
of suppressing pro-life speech. This decision was an overdue re-balancing
of the Court’s earlier reluctance to protect anti-abortion speech and a
counter-balancing of its earlier broad endorsement of the McCain-Feingold
political speech restrictions.
There has been no major Supreme Court abortion decision since 2007.
However, the free-speech rights of abortion protestors are still in
controversy. For example, in Snyder v. Phelps,341 the Court ruled that
protests at funerals of military personnel killed in action by members of the
Westboro Baptist Church, led by Pastor Fred Phelps, who demonstrate to
express their belief that God punishes the United States and its military
personnel because the United States tolerates homosexuality, could not give
rise to a tort judgment for damages for offending members of the fallen
soldier’s family.342 Here, the Court approved but distinguished its rulings
allowing government-imposed buffer zones at abortion clinics, noting that
although it had approved a similar injunction that required a buffer zone
337. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
338. Id. at 455-57. The Court explained:
Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) makes it a
federal crime for a corporation to use its general treasury funds to pay for any
“electioneering communication,” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2), which BCRA defines as any
broadcast that refers to a candidate for federal office and is aired within 30 days of a
federal primary election or 60 days of a federal general election in the jurisdiction
where that candidate is running, § 434(f)(3)(A).
Id.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 477.
131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
Id. at 1219-20.
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between protestors and an abortion clinic entrance in Madsen v. Women’s
Health Center, Inc.,343 the facts of Snyder were “obviously quite different”
in respect to both “the activity being regulated and the means of restricting
those activities.”344 At this point, it was clear that the Court was unable to
break the prejudiced habit of considering abortion protests at clinics to be
sui generis with limited First Amendment protection.345
In the fall of 2012, the Court issued a per curiam opinion in Lefemine v.
Wideman,346 providing that a pro-life protester was entitled to collect
attorney’s fees as a prevailing party.347 Lefemine and other pro-life
protestors held a demonstration at a busy intersection in a town in South
Carolina in which they held up signs of aborted fetuses. 348 When some
citizens complained about the graphic pictures, county police ordered
Lefemine to discard the signs or be ticketed for breach of the peace, which
eventually led him to disband the protest.349 A year later when the
protestors’ attorney notified the police that they intended to engage in a
similar demonstration and asserting their right to use the signs picturing
aborted fetuses without interference, the Chief of Police defended the prior
police action and promised it would be repeated if the signs were used.350
Lefemine filed a section 1983 civil rights action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and nominal damages.351 The federal court granted the
injunction, declared that defendants had violated Lefemine’s rights, but
denied monetary damages (under qualified immunity as the rule of law had
been uncertain), and denied his request for attorney’s fees.352 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that winning the injunction and
declaratory judgment did not make Lefemine a “prevailing party.”353 The
Supreme Court disagreed, and vacated and remanded the judgment.354
Because Lefemine had succeeded in removing the threat to his right to
demonstrate with the signs, he had achieved a “material alteration in the
parties’ relationship” and thus satisfied the test for being a “prevailing
343. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
344. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218.
345. After all, since the abortion doctrine is entirely a judicial creation, why should
opponents think that they have the right to express opposition to or disagreement with such a
divinely-created doctrine, especially at the temples of that doctrine?
346. 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012) (per curiam).
347. Id. at 11-12.
348. Id. at 10.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.at 10-11 (citing Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620-25 (D.S.C. 2010)).
353. Id. at 11 (citing Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 302–03 (4th Cir. 2012)).
354. Id. at 12.
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party” entitled to recover his attorneys’ fees, absent “unjust” exceptional
circumstances that had not been shown.355 While this did not involve
abortion rights or doctrine, it continues the line of cases suggesting that the
Court no longer is always hostile to protecting the First Amendment rights
of pro-life protestors, apart from clinic protests.
The Court has been dealing with certiorari petitions regarding
restrictions on pro-life speech for at least twenty years.356 In 2012, the
Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed Lefemine v. Wideman,
which involved a fee dispute arising from a challenge to such a
restriction.357 Lower courts have been dealing with such restrictions for
nearly forty years; accordingly, the Supreme Court’s affirmation that free
speech rights extend to pro-life protesters comes none too soon.358
Consequentially, the great bulk of the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence has been to strike down any pre-natal protection or other
legislation that might restrict, impede, or discourage a pregnant woman’s
decision to get or have access to an abortion. The few minor, collateral
exceptions (mostly in the past fifteen years) mostly related to finally (after
more than two decades of ignoring and upholding repression of pro-life free
speech) extending nearly normal protections to free expression by pro-life
advocates. Apart from those few peripheral and collateral issues (primarily
regarding funding and parental notice), the Court for four decades has
steadfastly protected, preserved, expanded, and reinforced the core
principles of the abortion doctrine by invalidating any laws that
significantly burden, encumber, inhibit, hamper, or delay access to abortion
on demand.
III. PRO-LIFE SPRING OF 2011-2013
Since 2010, there has been a notable eruption in pro-life legislation,
which reflects public repugnance about excesses, abuses and scandals
355. Id. at 11-12.
356. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Cloer v. Gynecology Clinic, Inc., 528 U.S.
1099 (2000); Lawson v. Murray, 525 U.S. 955 (1998); Williams v. Planned Parenthood ShastaDiablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 (1997); Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110 (1995); Winfield v.
Kaplan, 512 U.S. 1253 (1994). The Court has also reviewed a few such laws. See Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753 (1994).
357. Lafemine, 133 S. Ct. at 10.
358. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jarboe, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 554, 561 (C.P. Cumberland.
1979); O.B.G.Y.N. Ass’n v. Birthright of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 407 N.Y.S.2d 903, 906 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978); Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 84 (Colo. 1975) (en banc). In cases in which the
restrictions have been found to be content-neutral, they were thus subject only to intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-25; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763-68. Other cases have arisen
in nonpublic fora, where the government power to restrict speech is broader. See, e.g., Ctr. for
Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 920 (9th Cir. 2006).
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involving unregulated abortion-on-demand. The research arm or ally of
Planned Parenthood, the Alan Guttmacher Institute, reports that in 20122013 many abortion regulations were introduced, and some enacted. These
include:
(1) Abortion bans to replace Roe, have been introduced in
nineteen states, enacted in North Dakota and Arkansas, passed
one chamber in Montana.
(2) Abortion clinic regulation, requiring all or some abortion
providers to have hospital privileges or a transfer agreement
with a hospital, have been introduced in nine states, enacted in
Alabama, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Wyoming.
(3) Specific regulation of abortion providers in particular have
been introduced in ten states, enacted in Alabama, Indiana,
North Carolina, and Texas, passed one chamber in Minnesota.
(4) “Choose Life” license plate laws have been introduced in
four states, vetoed in Rhode Island.
(5) State funding of alternatives to abortion services have been
introduced in seven states, enacted in Kansas, Michigan,
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
(6) Insurance coverage of abortion laws concerning abortion
coverage in health plans offered through health exchanges.
Introduced in seventeen states and enacted in Arkansas, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Passed one chamber in
Minnesota.
(7) Private insurance coverage of abortion bills have been
introduced in eleven states and enacted in Kansas, North
Carolina, and South Carolina. Passed at least one chamber in
Georgia and Wisconsin and adopted by the state board in
Georgia.
(8) Public funding of abortion for low-income women has been
introduced in nine states. Enacted in Arkansas, Iowa, and
Maryland.
(9) Required abortion coverage has been introduced in two
states. Passed one chamber in Washington.
(10) Late-term abortion legislation including “partial birth”
abortions laws, post-viability abortions regulations or specified
gestational period abortions regulations have been introduced
in one form or another in seventeen states.
Specific
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gestational period abortions enacted by Arkansas, North
Dakota, and Texas.
(11) Bills to mandate counseling and waiting periods before
abortion including self-directed counseling that includes
information that the fetus can feel pain (two states) and
information that the fetus is a person (two states), have been
Introduced in seven states. Enacted in Ohio and Kansas.
Passed one chamber in Indiana.
Also, state-directed
counseling followed by a waiting period, including requiring a
woman to make two trips to the clinic (two states). These
have been introduced in fourteen states. Enacted in South
Dakota. Passed one chamber in Kentucky.
(12) Medication abortion regulations have been introduced in ten
states and enacted in Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, and Texas. Adopted by
the state board in Iowa.
(13) Parental involvement in minor’s abortion regulations have
been popular. Parental consent requirements have been
introduced in eight states. Enacted in Arkansas, Montana, and
Oklahoma. Parental notification requirements have been
introduced in seven states. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld
a 1995 law requiring parental notice.
(14) Physicians liability for abortions regulations have been
introduced in five states, and Enacted in Kansas and Montana.
(15) Physicians-only requirement for surgical and medical
abortions have been introduced in eleven states and enacted in
Indiana, Alabama, Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota, and
adopted by a state board in Iowa.
(16) Laws prohibiting coercing a woman into having an abortion
have been introduced in five states and enacted in Louisiana
and Montana.
(17) Laws forbidding sex and race selection abortions have been
introduced in seventeen states and enacted in Kansas, North
Carolina, and North Dakota. Such bills have passed one
chamber in Florida and Wisconsin.359

359. Monthly State Update: Major Developments in 2013, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/.
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Clearly there has been a lot of legislative activity in the states concerning
abortion. Some of these laws are designed to facilitate abortion, but most
are designed to prevent abortion abuses, exploitation, and dangerous,
potentially harmful practices.
A. NORTH DAKOTA ABORTION-REGULATION LEGISLATION ENACTED
IN 2013
In 2012-2013, the North Dakota legislature led the nation in enacting
laws regulating abortion. Among those new abortion laws are Senate Bill
2305,360 requiring physicians performing abortion procedures to have
hospital admitting privileges; House Bill 1456,361 prohibiting the
performance of abortions of unborn children when a heartbeat is
detected; Senate Bill 2368,362 establishing the state’s compelling interest in
the unborn human life from the time that unborn child is capable of feeling
pain; House Bill 1305,363 prohibiting abortions for the purpose of sex
selection or because of genetic abnormalities detected in the fetus;
and Senate Concurrent Resolution 4009,364 a concurrent resolution to create
and enact a new section of the Constitution of North Dakota relating to the
inalienable right to life of every human being at every stage of
development. Two other bills relating to abortion were introduced in the
North Dakota legislature in 2013 but did not pass. Senate Bill 2303
proposed to amend the definition of “human being”365 and Senate Bill
2302366 proposed to prohibit abortions except when necessary to save the
life of the pregnant woman.
Senate Bill 2305 amended subsection one of North Dakota Century
Code section 14-02.1-04 to read:
An abortion may not be performed by any person other than a
physician who is using applicable medical standards and who is
360. S.B 2305, 63rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.1-04(1) (2013)).
361. H.B. 1456, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.1-05.2(1) (2013)).
362. S.B. 2368, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.1-05.3(1) (2013)).
363. H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.1-04.1(1) (2013)).
364. S. Con. Res. 4009, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).
365. S.B 2303, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013). This bill passed the second
reading in the Senate, but failed the second reading in the House. See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for
Prelim. Inj. at 2, MKB Mgmt. Corp., v. Stenehjem, No. 1:13-CV-071 (D.N.D. July 19, 2013).
366. S.B. 2302, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013). This bill failed the second
reading in the Senate. See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 2, MKB Mgmt. Corp., v.
Stenehjem, No. 1:13-CV-071 (D.N.D. July 19, 2013).
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licensed to practice in this state. All physicians performing
abortion procedures must have admitting privileges at a hospital
located within thirty miles [42.28 kilometers] of the abortion
facility and staff privileges to replace hospital on-staff physicians
at that hospital. These privileges must include the abortion
procedures the physician will be performing at abortion facilities.
An abortion facility must have a staff member trained in
cardiopulmonary resuscitation present at all times when the
abortion facility is open and abortions are scheduled to be
performed. 367
The statute is largely unremarkable except for the fact that the need for such
basic regulations of the provision of medical services of any kind is
noteworthy. That fact may reveal something disturbing about the lack of
self-regulation within the abortion industry. The validity of the principle
that doctors performing abortion must be licensed to practice in the state in
which he or she is performing abortions and should have admitting and staff
privileges at a hospital within reasonable proximity of the place of abortion
seem reasonable in light of the record of abortion complications, injuries,
and even deaths that have occurred with tragic frequency.368 The state
interest in protecting the medical safety of the provision of abortion services
in its jurisdiction is indisputable.369 However, the group of doctors most
likely to perform abortions, the American Congress of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (“ACOG”), has issued a statement in which they have voiced
their disapproval of a law requiring admitting privileges, thinking the law is
singling out abortion providers, asserting:
ACOG opposes legislation or other requirements that single out
abortion services from other outpatient procedures. For example,
ACOG opposes laws or other regulations that require abortion
providers to have hospital admitting privileges. ACOG also
367. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(1) (2013) (emphasis added).
368. See John Hurdle & Trip Gabriel, Philadelphia Abortion Doctor Guilty of Murder in
Late-Term
Procedures,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
13,
2013,
available
at
http://www nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/kermit-gosnell-abortion-doctor-found-guilty-ofmurder html?_r=0 (describing abortionist convicted of numerous violations of law, causing death
of adult woman patient and of killing several born-alive fetuses).
369. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007) (upholding abortion
regulations of intact D & E abortions to protect medical safety of abortion); Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327-39 (2006) (parental involvement statutes are
permissible to protect the health and other interests of minors and parents); Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974-75 (1997) (“[W]e emphasized that our prior cases ‘left no doubt
that, to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the States may mandate that only physicians
perform abortions.’“) (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 447
(1983)).
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opposes facility regulations that are more stringent for abortion
than for other surgical procedures of similar low risk.370
The last part of the ACOG statement seems to reveal the motive and
purpose—ACOG wants to insure that abortion procedures are not treated
differently than any other procedures of similar risk to the patient.
Moreover, ACOG also “believes physicians who provide medical and
surgical procedures, including abortion services, in their offices, clinics, or
freestanding ambulatory care facilities, should have a plan to ensure prompt
emergency services if a complication occurs and should establish a
mechanism for transferring patients who require emergency treatment.”371
So ACOG provides no principled medical or professional basis for
opposition to laws like the North Dakota law from a medical perspective,
only a political concern that abortion not be “single[d] out”372 for more
regulation than other procedures of similar medical risk. Of course,
abortion involves such serious moral, religious, and ethical concerns that
are really not comparable with most therapeutic medical procedures or even
most other elective, non-therapeutic procedures. At the end of July 2013, a
state court judge granted a temporary restraining order barring enforcement
of House Bill 2305’s hospital admission privileges for doctors performing
abortions in North Dakota.373
House Bill 1456 requires that a physician “may not perform an
abortion on a pregnant woman before determining, in accordance with
standard medical practice, if the unborn child the pregnant woman is
carrying has a detectable heartbeat,”374 and bars abortion of a child with a
heartbeat unless necessary to save the life or “to prevent a serious risk of the
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the
pregnant woman, or to save the life of an unborn child.”375 Texas,376
Ohio,377 and Arkansas378 have introduced or enacted bills that are
370. Statement on State Legislation Requiring Hospital Admitting Privileges for Physicians
Providing Abortion Services AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Apr. 23,
2013),
http://www.acog.org/About%20ACOG/News%20Room/News%20Releases/2013/Hospital%20Ad
mitting%20Privileges%20for%20Physicians%20Providing%20Abortion%20Services.aspx.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Woman’s Safety Law Enjoined by Fargo Judge, N.D. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE (July 31,
2013), http://ndcatholic.org/latestnews/?cat’4.
374. H.B. 1456, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.1-05.2(1) (2013)).
375. H.B. 1456, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-02.1-05(2)(a) (2013)). This section also makes it a class C felony for a physician to violate this
provision. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05(4) (2013).
376. H.B. 59, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
377. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011).
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substantially similar to the North Dakota bill, while Oklahoma requires
doctors to inform women that they can hear the heartbeat of their unborn
child (at eight weeks or later gestation) if they so choose.379 At least two
other state legislatures also have considered fetal heartbeat bills.380 A
federal district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement
of North Dakota House Bill 1456 and Senate Bill 2305.381
House Bill 2368 enacted four new provisions of the North Dakota
Century Code governing performance of abortions by: 1) requiring the
doctor performing the abortion to attempt to ascertain “the post-fertilization
age of the unborn child”;382 2) prohibiting the abortion of an unborn child of
twenty or more weeks post-fertilization age;383 3) requiring the facility to
record the probable post-fertilization age of the aborted unborn child, the
method of abortion used, whether intra-fetal injunction was used,384 and; 4)
protecting the anonymity of the woman upon who abortion is performed.385
This new law took effect August 1, 2013 and no efforts to judicially enjoin
enforcement of it were filed.386 House Bill 1305, amending section 1402.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, bans sex-selection abortions
and abortions done because the unborn child has an actual or potential
genetic abnormality (such as Trisomy 23).387 The abortion clinic in North
378. S.B 134, 89th. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-16-1304 (2013)). This restriction has since been held unconstitutional. See Edwards v.
Beck, No. 4:13CV00224 SWW, 2014 WL 1245267 (E.D. Ark. March 14, 2014).
379. S.B. 1274, 53rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2012) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1745.14 (2012)).
380. H.B. 2324, 2013 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2013); H.B. 97, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013).
See also Laura Hancock, Wyoming House Panel Votes Down Abortion Bill, WYO. STAR TRIB.,
Jan. 29, 2013, available at http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/wyominghouse-panel-votes-down-abortion-bill/article_bb56bab3-9ce9-5b40-a968-559b0e155e07 html.
381. See generally Latest News, Updated Status on Abortion Legislation – September 13,
2013, N.D. CATHOLIC CONF. (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://ndcatholic.org/latestnews/?p=1714
(hereinafter “Updated Status”).
382. S.B. 2368, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 3 (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.1-05.3(2) (2013)).
383. Id. § 4 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05.3(3) (2013)).
384. Id. § 5 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-07 (2013)). Abortions that are
performed in violation of these section are punishable as a class C felony and actionable civilly by
the mother or father of the unborn child aborted. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05(4) (2013).
385. Id. § 7 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.3 (2013)).
386. See generally Updated Status, supra note 381.
387. H. B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 2 (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013)
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a physician may not intentionally
perform or attempt to perform an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant woman is
seeking the abortion solely: a. On account of the sex of the unborn child; or b. Because
the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic abnormality or a potential
for a genetic abnormality.
Id.
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Dakota originally filed suit to enjoin enforcement of this new law, but it
later withdrew its legal challenge.388
Senate Concurrent Resolution 4009 proposed to amend the North
Dakota Constitution by added a new section to Article 1. It would read as
follows: “The inalienable right to life of every human being at any stage of
development must be recognized and protected.”389 The legislature passed
the proposed the amendment; now it must be voted upon by the people of
North Dakota during the general election to be held on November 4,
2014.390
The North Dakota abortion legislation is not unique. At least six other
states have passed or introduced bills with similar regulations. Wisconsin
passed a bill that has as its first section wording almost verbatim to that of
the North Dakota laws; that is that the physician must have admitting rights
to a hospital within thirty miles of the abortion location.391 Similar to the
North Dakota law, a federal judge has enjoined enforcement of the law for
four months.392 A trial is set for November 25, 2013 in the case in which
Planned Parenthood is the party challenging the law.393
Texas passed House Bill 2, which was scheduled to come into effect
at the end of October, 2013.394 The admitting privileges and the hospital
proximity are the same as in North Dakota.395 It is reported that this new
law has already caused seven abortion clinics to announce that they will
probably have to shut down because of the restrictions.396

388. See Updated Status, supra note 381.
389. S. Con. Res. 4009, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess.(N.D. 2013).
390. See Updated Status, supra note 381.
391. See S.B. 206 § 1(2), 2013 Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wisc. 2013) (codified at WIS.
STAT § 253.095 (2013).
392. See Todd Richmond, Federal Judge Blocks Admitting Privileges Mandate in New
Abortion
Law
WISCONSIN
ST.
J.,
Aug.
2,
2013,
available
at
http://host madison.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/federal-judge-blocks-admitting-privilegesmandate-in-new-abortion-law/article_e776a184-b748-54f0-90dc-d635ad11eb8a.html.
393. Id.
394. H.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 171
(2013)).
395. Id. (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 171.0031(2013)). The admitting privileges
provision has since been upheld. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Serv. v.
Abbot, No. 13–51008, 2014 WL 1257965 (5th Cir. March 27, 2014). The Texas bill also states
that abortions are no longer allowed after twenty weeks unless a threat to the life of the mother is
present or serious abnormalities to the child. Id. (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 171.044
(2013)).
396. See Brittney Martin, Some Texas Abortion Clinics Prepare to Shut Down After New
Law,
DALLAS
NEWS,
Sept.
4,
2013,
available
at
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/headlines/20130904-some-texas-abortion-clinicsprepare-to-shut-down-after-new-state-law.ece.
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The North Carolina legislature has created a bill similar to this North
Dakota law.397 In addition, it also requires that the physician must remain
with the patient throughout the entire procedure and during the recovery
period.398 The North Carolina Legislature has codified this proposal.399
Alabama House Bill 57 was passed by the legislature and sent to the
governor in April,400 and the governor signed the bill into law on or about
April 18, 2013.401 This bill does not specify a proximity requirement, but
indicates that the person performing the abortion must have admitting
privileges at a hospital within the same metropolitan statistical area as the
facility where the abortion occurs.402 Additionally, the bill declares:
“[a]bortion not only involves a surgical procedure with the usual risks
attending surgery, but also involves the taking of human life.”403
Mississippi enacted a law similar to Senate Bill 2305404 that took effect
in 2012.405 While the Mississippi law does not have a proximity
requirement, it provides that the physician performing the abortion must
have admitting privileges to a hospital.406 This could be very significant
because Mississippi only has one abortion clinic. It has been speculated—
perhaps overly-optimistically/pessimistically—that the law could make
Mississippi the first elective-abortion-free state in the nation.407 Kansas
enacted a law in 2011 as part of their state budget, similar to the North
Dakota law.408 It requires that a physician performing an abortion must
have admitting privileges to a hospital that is within a thirty-mile radius of
their facility.409

397. Amend Women’s Right to Know Act, S.B. 308, 2013 Leg., Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2013),
398. Id.
399. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82 (2013).
400. See H.B. 57, 2013 Leg., Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ala 2013).
401. John Shyrock, Gov. Bentley to sign HB 57 Abortion Bill Tuesday, WSFA COM., Apr. 8,
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B. REASONS FOR THE PRO-LIFE SPRINGTIME OF 2011-2013
Many causal influences might be identified as contributing to the prolife spring at the beginning of the twenty-first century, particularly in the
first three years of the second decade of this century. Nonetheless, three
factors in particular may have been the most influential in providing the
catalyst for pro-life legislation: (1) some shocking abortion scandals; (2) the
adoption and implementation of President Obama’s unpopular, broad
healthcare law (dubbed “Obamacare”) including its contraceptive (qua
abortifacient) mandate; and (3) growing sense that there are many ways to
avoid and prevent the tragedy of unwanted pregnancy and better
alternatives than abortion.
There have been several shocking scandals (including deaths of
patients) involving abortion, abortion clinics, and abortion doctors in recent
years. The most recent, and extremely deplorable, was the conviction of
Philadelphia’s Dr. Kermit Gosnell for the deaths of born-alive aborted
fetuses and injuries to their women submitting to abortions at his hands. As
one report summarized:
Late-term abortionist Kermit Gosnell was convicted Monday of
first-degree murder in the deaths of three infants who were born
alive after botched abortions performed in his run-down West
Philadelphia clinic. He was also found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter in the death of Karnamaya Mongar, a 41-year-old
woman who died from an overdose of anesthetic drugs during an
abortion procedure.
The jury’s deliberations came after six weeks of harrowing
testimony detailing the brutal deaths of newborns and unthinkable
mistreatment of women. These murders followed failed abortions
performed after Pennsylvania’s 24-week limit.
In addition to the four murder charges, Gosnell was also convicted
of more than 200 other criminal counts including violating
Pennsylvania’s informed consent law and performing illegal lateterm abortions.410
One of the babies Dr. Gosnell killed in his clinic he said was so big it
could “walk to the bus.”411

410. Sarah Torre, Morning Bell: Serving Justice to Gosnell, HERITAGE FOUND., May 14,
2013, http://blog heritage.org/2013/05/14/morning-bell-serving-justice-to-gosnell/.
411. Steven Ertelt, Kermit Gosnell Receives Third Consecutive Life Term for Killing Baby,
LIFENEWS.COM, May 15, 2013, http://www.lifenews.com/2013/05/15/kermit-gosnell-receivesthird-consecutive-life-term-for-killing-baby/.
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Gosnell was convicted . . . of first-degree murder in the deaths of
three babies born alive after an abortion process that involved
jabbing them in the neck with scissors . . . . Gosnell gave up his
right to appeal the verdict that found him guilty on three of the
four first-degree murder charges he faced. As a result, prosecutors
agreed to two life terms in prison and Gosnell would not face the
death penalty.412
While the Gosnell trial was underreported by mainstream media, what
little got into the press was galvanizing. As the New York Times reported:
In the witness box, clinic employees said live births occurred
regularly, and they believed Dr. Gosnell’s explanation for snipping
necks with surgical scissors — to “ensure fetal demise” — was
accepted practice in late-term abortions. An abortion doctor who
testified for the prosecution said such practice was unheard of.
One witness, Steven Massof, testifying under a plea agreement to
avoid first-degree murder charges, instructed jurors to feel the
backs of their own necks and said, “It’s like a beheading.”
Another former employee, Adrienne Moton, sobbed as she
described the death of Baby A, aborted when his teenage mother
was about 29 weeks pregnant. Ms. Moton was so upset she took a
cellphone photograph of him, which was shown in court. She said
Dr. Gosnell had joked that the baby was big enough to walk to a
bus stop.
Ms. Moton, who also testified under a plea agreement, said she cut
the neck of Baby D, who was delivered into a toilet while its
mother, given a large dose of a drug to dilate the cervix, waited for
Dr. Gosnell to arrive.
Another clinic worker said she followed Dr. Gosnell’s instructions
and cut the neck of Baby C after it moved an arm. The doctor told
her was an “involuntary movement.”413
Such negative publicity (and the Gosnell case is just the most recent
notorious example of many) reveals the ghastly practices and callous ethics
of the abortion business and probably has contributed to the pro-life
legislative boom in the past few years.
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Second, the attempt (so-far successful) by President Obama to expand
medical insurance by forcing insurers, employers, and covered employees
to implement insurance coverage for elective abortions has provoked a lot
of controversy.414 “The mandate forces employers, regardless of their
religious or moral convictions, to facilitate insurance coverage for abortioninducing drugs, sterilization and contraception under threat of heavy
penalties.”415 The government coercion coupled with the controversy has
breathed new life into pro-life efforts.
Third, awareness of alternatives that can prevent the need for abortion
also seems to have grown. Pregnant women today generally are not so
naive and easily exploitable as to be misled into thinking that their dilemma
is an abortion-or-bear-and-raise-an-unwanted-child scenario. Attitudes of
Americans about abortion have stabilized in the past fifteen years. As
responses to the question “[w]ith respect to the abortion issue, would you
consider yourself to be pro-choice or pro-life?” indicate, Gallup reports that
from 1998 to 2013 the percentage of Americans self-identifying as pro-life
has ranged from 45% to 51%, while the percentage of Americans selfidentifying as pro-choice has ranged from 41% to 51%.416 For the past five
years, (since 2009) pro-life advocates have tied or exceeded pro-choice
proponents nearly all the time and in nearly every year.417
Likewise, more Americans believe that abortion is morally wrong than
believe that it is morally acceptable. The Gallup data reveals that 49% of
Americans think that abortion is morally wrong as opposed to 42% that
think it is morally acceptable.418 The Gallup Poll reports as of May, 2013
show that 52% of the Americans surveyed believe that abortion should be
“legal only under certain circumstances,” while only 26% believe that
abortion should be “legal under any circumstances” and 20% believe that it

414. See, e.g., Jeffrey Young, Obamacare Provokes 21 States Into Banning Abortion
Coverage By Private Health Insurers, HUFFPOST POLITICS, Sept. 3, 2013,
http://www huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/03/obamacare-abortion-coverage_n_3839720 html;
Defend Religious Liberty – Stop Forced Abortion Pill Coverage, AM. CENTER L. & JUST.,
http://aclj.org/obamacare/defend-religious-liberty-stop-forced-abortion-pill-coverage; Terrence P.
Jeffrey, Obama Orders Catholics to Act Aginst Their Faith; Bishops Call it ‘Unconscionable’,
CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 22, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-orders-catholics-actagainst-their-faith-bishops-call-it-unconscionable.
415. Abby Carr, 26 Religious Colleges Take Stand Against Abortion-Pill Mandate,
CHARISMANEWS, Apr. 15, 2013, http://www.charismanews.com/us/39081-26-religious-collegestake-stand-against-abortion-pill-mandate.
416. Abortion, GALLUP, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last
visited May 2, 2014).
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should be “illegal in all circumstances.”419 Likewise, a July 2013 report by
the PewResearch Religion & Public Life Project confirms that public
opinion has been remarkably stable for the past twenty years, with minor
vacillations holding steady (when given two choices only – “legal in
all/most cases or illegal in all/most cases”) at about 55% pro-choice and
about 45% pro-life.420
Even general public media occasionally have acknowledged that most
Americans are pro-choice regarding early abortions and hard-case abortions
only, but that most Americans are pro-life regarding elective abortions,
especially after the first trimester of pregnancy. As an article in the
Washington Post in 2011 reported:
Except in the first few years after Roe v. Wade made abortion
legal, when public acceptance grew, sentiment around the issue
has not moved much. Nor is there a large generational divide.
That distinguishes abortion from other contentious social issues,
such as same-sex marriage and marijuana legalization, where
overall public opinion — led by the young — has shifted
dramatically in favor of a more liberal position.
For decades, polls have shown that most people want abortion to
be available to women, at least in the early stages of pregnancy,
when the vast majority occur.
But Americans get increasingly uncomfortable with the procedure
as a fetus gets closer to viability. In December, a Gallup poll found
roughly six in 10 saying abortion should be legal in the first three
months of pregnancy, but support dropped to 27 percent in the
second trimester and to 14 percent in the third.
Data just released by the National Opinion Research Center show
that most Americans think the woman’s decision to have an
abortion is justified in some instances — rape (where 78 percent
support abortion as an option), fetal deformity (77 percent) and
serious danger to her health (87 percent), for example. But they do
not support it when an abortion is sought because the woman
believes she is too poor to have more children (a situation in which

419. Id. The other two percent had “no opinion.” Id. The minor differences in the pro-life
and pro-choice percentages in answer to these questions reveals both the difference to some
respondents that the phrasing of the question may make in the results. But they also reveal
general, strong consistency in the pro-life and pro-choice designations.
420. Public Opinion on Abortion Slideshow, PEWRESEARCH (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://features.pewforum.org/abortion-slideshow/.
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45 percent say they approve of an abortion) or doesn’t want to
marry the father (42 percent).421
IV. THE COMING OF ANOTHER WINTER OF REPRESSION FOR
PRO-LIFE PUBLIC LEGISLATION AND ACTIVITY
Political seasons like the climatic seasons of the year change. It would
be unrealistic to believe that any one season will last forever. The recent
enactment of many pro-life laws by various state legislatures signals the end
of a social winter season of casual acceptance and tolerance of horrific
killing of pre-natal human life and human lives. That season may be
passing, or at least waning.
For example, in MKB Management
Corporation v. Burdick,422 the United States District Court of North Dakota
granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the fetal heartbeat
bill, North Dakota House Bill No. 1446.423 A similar Texas abortion law
also was enjoined by a trial court,424 but the U.S. Court of Appeals
suspended that judicial restraint.425
However, the new springtime of pro-life values and legislation will
also be temporary. That should motivate persons with serious, strong prolife values to accomplish as much as they can in this short season. It should
sober them to act carefully and enact laws that are likely to survive
challenge and to endure even when the favorable season ends and proabortion values and actors again are dominant.
V. CONCLUSION: ROSES IN WINTER
The darkness of Winter may become our habitual and natural
environment. As Emily Dickinson wrote: “[w]e grow accustomed to the
Dark –/ When Light is put away.”426 It is in human nature to adjust to and
accommodate to living in current circumstances. So, if we are not wary,
abortion-on-demand may be normalized, routinized, accepted even by
421. Karen Tumulty, Four decades after Roe v. Wade, views of most Americans still
complex,
conditional,
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422. 954 F. Supp. 2d 900 (D.N.D. 2013).
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424. Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Serv. v. Abbott, 951 F.Supp.2d
891 (W.D. Tex. 2013), stay granted in part, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013), judgment reversed in
part, No. 13–51008, 2014 WL 1257965 (5th Cir. 2014).
425. See generally Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Serv. v. Abbot, No.
13–51008, 2014 WL 1257965 (5th Cir. 2014).
426. Emily Dickinson, We grow accustomed to the Dark –(428), POETRY FOUND.,
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Americans with basically pro-life values as they live is a pervasively proabortion society that habituates all of its members, all men, women and
children, to the ethic of abortion-on-demand (if the term can correctly be
applied to abortion-on-demand). Some believe that it already has become
generally accepted in American society.
North Dakota’s bouquet of pro-life laws enacted in 2013 is a reminder
of the Spring of pro-life values and activities. May North Dakota’s actions
set an example that will be followed by lawmakers and officials in other
states and in the branches, agencies and officials of the United States.
Perhaps this Pro-life Spring can last a little longer.

